Volume 25

Issue 1

3-1921

Dickinson Law Review - Volume 25, Issue 6

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Dickinson Law Review - Volume 25, Issue 6, 25 DICK. L. REV. 153 ().
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol25/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
FEBRUARY, 1921

Vol. XXV

BUSINESS MANAGERS

No. 5
EDITORS

Thomas D. Caldwell
Paul E. Beaver
Paul Ridgway
William F. Scheufele

George C. Hering, Jr.
David R. Perry
Clyde L Kelchner
Edward N. Polisher

Wilbur C. Bishop

Robert L. Goeltz

Subscription Price #.SO Per Year

Roman Responsa Prudentum and English Case
Law; Their Resemblances and Differences.
Formerly in England and more recently in the
United States there was a prejudice against the study
of Roman law, and the absorption of its equitable principles into the body of the common law. Knowledge of
the Roman law in England, except among professed canonists, declined rapidly after the reign of Edward II.
There was no question of hostility. The sixteenth century was the time of recrimination between common
lawyers and civilians and perhaps of some real danger
to the common law, but the more able jurists of later
times appreciated the importance of a thorough knowledge of this most wonderful system of jurisprudence.
Sir Matthew Hale frequently said that "the true ground
and reason of law was so well delivered in the Digest
of Justinian that a man could never well understand law
as a science without first resorting to the Roman law
for information," and he lamented that it was so little
studied in England.
Lord Holt admitted that the laws of all nations were
raised out of the ruins of the civil law, and that the principles of the English law were borrowed from that system and grounded upon the same reason.
While the
study of Roman law is exceedingly important and inter1
Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law p. 88.

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

esting, a thorough knowledge of it would require a vast
amount of application and research.
Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, Lecture 23
says, "I am satisfied that no part of the civil law can
be examined and no period of its history can be touched,
by a person not educated under that system, without
finding himself at once admonished of the difficulty and
delicacy of the task by reason of the overwhelming mass
of learning and criticism which presses upon every
branch of his inquiry.
Nevertheless the civil law, as
a system of jurisprudence, framed by wise men and approved by the experience of ages, must in every country and in every age furnish principles which, modified
and applied as circumstances may require, will greatly
contribute to the real interest and welfare of society,2 for
it is truly "the art of what is good and fair,"2 in other
words the law of nature, which is as much the law of
today as it was when the first human society was established on earth, and is as binding on the Almighty as
upon human beings who in case they violate it are automatically punished. It is the law of right and wrong
which does not change because it cannot change 3 and
certainly should control the actions of all men and no
less so the will of God, for any other conception of the
volition of the Diety would belittle our idea of him.

Roman Judicial Procedure
Before minutely considering the subject Responsa
Prudentum, it will be well to take a view of the constitution of the Roman courts civil law procedure,
inasmuch as the Responsa Prudentum had to do with the
administration of justice in the Roman courts.
It seems that court proceedings were very largely
under the direction of the Praetor, a Roman officer, or
2
Gayle
3

vs. Cunningham, Harp S. C. Equity, pages 124-133.
Morris, History of the Development of Law, p. 25.
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magistrate, appointed annually for that and other purposes.

The Praetor
It was the duty of the Praetor to"make up the issue
for each case from the preliminary statements of the
parties. This was called the formula.
This function
of the Praetor was a very important one in advancing
the final determination of the case and it must have facilitated the trial of the cause very much to have this
done by an unprejudiced official. Many times in the
trial of, causes, under common law procedure, the court
is puzzled to ascertain just what the issue is from the
allegations and statements of the counsel in the case,
for it sometimes happens that if the client has a weak
case, it might be dangerous for his counsel to state
clearly and concisely the real issue; again others do not
have the knowledge and ability to do so.
If the facts submitted were agreed upon and the only
question presented was one of law, the Praetor decided
the case without submitting it to the Judex. The formula being made up, the determination of the question at
issue was delegated to the Judex.

The Judex
The functions of the Judex were not the same as
of our judges, but it would seem more nearly like those
of a jury, or referee, in the English courts, for although
the law was not in all cases laid down for him by the
Praetor, still he acted within narrow limits, the case
being made up for him with directions as to what his
findings should be if certain allegations were proved,
and while it sometimes became necessary for him to decide points of law and apply them during the progress
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of a trial, yet if such application of the law was wrong,
or a law was invoked which did not fit the case his findings could be overruled by the Praetor, and if the Judex
went intentionally outside the formula submitted to him
and assumed to determine an issue not submitted, he became liable to a penalty.
The Judex was usually chosen, or nominated, by the
plaintiff from among a certain number who had been
designated by the Praetor, at the beginning of his term
of office, to act in that capacity. These persons were
not ordinarily such as were versed in the law.

The Patroni or Orators
The parties were assisted in their presentation of
the cause by Orators or Patroni, who made an opening
of the case and a closing argument much as our advocates do today. Even these functionaries were not expert lawyers, as was admitted by Cicero, one of the most
famous of them, who said of himself, that he had very
little legal learning and intimated that a small amount
of it was adequate for the purpose of his profession, as
when it- became desirable to know the law applicable to
each particular case it could be ascertained by applying
to the jurisconsulti, the authority who rendered the Responsa Prudentum.
The Judex had no power to enforce his findings or
verdict. This was reported back to the Praetor and the
judgment in the case was enforced by him. This and
other features of the powers and functions of the Judex
suggest our jury system, which system in all probability
came to England from the Continent, possibly having
been derived from the Roman law.

The Jurisconsulti
The Jurisconsulti were the ultimate sources of legal
knowledge. The Praetor was at first a patrician and
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was elected in the comita centuriata,though the office
in time became accessible to plebians. Business soon
required a second Praetor to preside over the causes of
foreigners, called praetor peregrinus and praetors were
afterwards allotted to the provinces as the Empire extended.
Under Augustus, the praetors had increased to sixteen and in the time of Pomponius, there were eighteen,
one of them being a judge de fidicommisso.

The Praetor's Edict
Every Praetor on entering into office, promulgated
certain rules and forms as the principles and methods by
which he proposed to administer justice for his term,
which was one year. He had no power to alter these
rules and this jus praetorium vel honorarium tempered
the ancient law by the spirit of equity and public utility
and it was called "the living interpretor of the civil
law." The edicts of the Praetor were generally declaratory of the customary, or unwritten, law and practice
of his predecessors. But as the Praetor was apt to
vary from his annual edict, and to change it according
to circumstances, which opened the way to many frauds,
it was provided by a law enacted at the instance of the
tribune Caius Cornelius, that the Praetor should adhere
to his edict promulgated on the commencement of his
magistracy. These praetorian edicts were studied as
the most interesting branch of Roman law and they became a substitute for the knowledge of the twelve tables.
They were frequently commented upon and a large part
of the matter of the Responsa Prudentum related to the
praetor's edict.'
4Kent's Commentaries, Note 1, p. 524.
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Roman Jurists
Taking up the jurists of Rome, we find they fall
into three classes:
1. The pontiffs and early lay jurists whose chief
work was "interpretatio."
2. The jurists, called the "veteres" who came after
the period of "interpretatio" and before the time of the
classical jurisprudence.
3. The classical jurists.

The Interpretatio
First, the interpretatio of the pontiffs. The close
relation between law and religion which seems characteristic of early times renders comprehensible the fact
that originally the knowledge and practice of the
Roman law was confined almost entirely to the College
of Pontiffs, who choose one from among their number
each year to superintendent disputes between citizens.
It seems surprising that this condition of things which
amounted to a practical monopoly should have continued
for more than a century after the publication of the XIL
Tables which took place 449 or 450 B. C.
When Gaius and Justinian tell of the jurists as the
makers of the law, they allude to a much later class of
persons learned in the law in the time of the Empire,
but these earlier ecclesiastical persons are also entitled
to be regarded as exercising legislative powers; because
though theoretically they simply expounded the law as
promulgated in the XII Tables, still by the construction
they give to it, a large body of new law was evolved. Case
law in England and America rests on much the same
fiction.
As Sir Henry Maine has shown, an English
judge never admits that he is making new law; he is simply applying known rules to different sets of circumstances; but whenever he determines a case to which no existing custom, statute or precedent applies, he creates a
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new precedent which, save in the comparatively rare
case of reversal on appeal, will be followed by other
judges under like circumstances, and so form a new law.

The Veteres
Second.
The Veteres.
About 300 B. C. Appius
Claudius Caecus made a record of the legius actiones
which Flavius, the son of a freedman, who was acting
as secretary to Claudius, stole and published to the world
in 304 B. C., as the Jus Flavianum. Some fifty years
later, Tiberian Coruncanius, who was pontifex maximus,
took to giving public oral expositions of the law to any
one who desired to attend, "publice profitere."
In the year 204 B. C., the legal formula for actions
was made public property for a second time by Sextus
Aelius in the Jus Aelianum. From this time therefore
the monopoly of the pontiffs was at an end, and a knowledge of the law was made possible for priests or laymen
and so we come almost at once to the school of the early
lay jurists the "veteres" as opposed to their juniors the
later "classical" lawyers. The work of the Roman jurists is summed up in four words: scribere, agere, respor,
dere, cavere. Scribere embraced the compilation of legal
treaties and probably written responsa or advise given
in particular cases; agere referred to the conduct of a
suit in court; respondere, giving answers to questions on
matters of law; cavere, safe-guarding the interests of a
client in the preliminary stages of a case, especially in
the make-up of the formula. The veteres were probably
more concerned in the work implied by the makeup of
the formula than in written systematic exposition; were
in fact rather lawyers than jurists; but they may be regarded nevertheless as starting the juristic literature
which their followers, the classical jurists brought to
perfection.
Two important developments are to be found in the
time of Augustus: first the placing of the more
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distinguished jurists in a position of pre-eminence by
means of the jus respondendi; secondly, a division of the
jurists themselves into rival schools-the Proculians
and the Sabinians.

Classical Jurists
Third, the period of classical jurisprudence is generally considered as beginning with the reign of Hadrian. Prominent among the classical jurists was Gaius,
who wrote in the time of Antonieus and whose insitutes
for more than three hundred years performed the same
service for Roman law students as Blackstone's commentaries did for successive generations of young English
lawyers. Another was Papinian, the greatest of all Roman jurists, whose most important works were nineteen
"libri responsorum" and thirty-nine "questionum libri."
Ulpinus was a contemporary of Papinian, whose writings
are represented in Justinian's Digest, to a greater extent
than any other jurist's, about one-third of the Digest
being made up of the same. From the writings of Modestinus, a pupil of Ulpianus there are three hundred and
forty-four extracts in the Digest. The period of classical jurisprudence then, began in the second century,
reached its climax with Papinian and ended abruptly in
the middle of. the third century, for after Modestinus
the development of Roman law was carried on almost
entirely by Imperial constitutions.
The influence of classical jurists may be summed up
as follows; their work was four-fold.
(1). After the "interpretatio"of the early ecclesiastical lawyers had come to an end, the development of Roman law was carried on mainly by means of the reforms
effected by the Praetor's edict; for although the "veteres
jurisprudentes" undoubtedly did improve the law, it was
probably less by their writings than by the direct influence which they brought to bear upon the Praetors.
The growth of the Praetorian law, however, came to an
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end with the "Edictum perpetuum" in Hadrian's time
and the first task of the later jurists was to take the law
as stated in the edicts where it had grown up bit by bit,
and reduce it to some sort of order and system.
(2). The edict had resulted in a "duplication of
institutions." A given transaction might be governed
by one set of rules at jus civile, by another at jus honorarum. The classical jurists, to some extent, but by no
means finally, reconciled their divergencies.
(3). The division of jurists into the schools of Proculians and Sabinians has given rise to endless differences in point of detail. Here again the jurists did something by the way of reconcilation, though many of the
disputes were settled only by Justinian himself.
(4). The law contained in the edicts was not final. Political reasons had rendered it impossible to effect further improvement in the law by its means, but
there were new legal problems waiting solution. These
the jurists solved by what Sohm happily called a "new
interpretatio." Just as at an earlier date the XII Tables had to be "interpreted," so now it was necessary to
subject the Pretorian edict to a similar process. And
in the result, especially in the domain of obligations, the
classical jurists built up a body of law which, alike in
substance and form, remains a model for all time.5
In their origin the Responsa Prudentum were nothing more than private opinions of particular lawyers,
but after they had been generally adopted by the legal
profession, and recognized by the judicial tribunals, they
acquired the authority of law and they proved an important factor in the evolution of law from the time of
the XII Tables.6
For statutes like the XII Tables
must necessarily be interpreted by legal experts after
thorough forensic discussion. And furthermore by the
6

Leage R. W., Roman Private Law pages 26-29.
Roby
Introduction to Justinians Digest, p. 15.
6
Roman Law by Lord Mackenzie.
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constitution of Roman society in those early days prominent citizens were expected to assert and defend the
rights of a numerous array of relatives and clients, which
contributed to produce a class of jurisconsulti. And so
there grew up in Rome, an important class of men who
made it their chief business to apply the law to the numberless complications of social life and to advise those
who sought their opinions, and the outgrowth of such a
system was stimulated by the peculiar relation of patron
and client. The opinion of such experts would be sought
by magistrates and referees as well as by private persons
so in the order of development came the Responsa Prudentum, the answers or decisions of the jurisconsulti, as
a part of a growing system. At first, their opinions,
while they were freely sought both by the judge and
party, were not binding but merely advisory, though
naturally very persuasive.
In the time of Augustus,
however, they received official and imperial sanction,
and in the time of Tribonian were defined as follows in
the Institutes of Justinian, to wit:

Jus Respondendi
The Responsa Prudentum are decisions and opinions of persons authorized to determine the law. For
anciently it was provided that there should be persons
to interpret publicly the law who were permitted by the
Emperor to have the Jus Respondendi and who were called jurisconsulti, and the authority of their decisions
and opinions when they were unanimous was such that
the judge could not refuse to be guided by these responses.
These answers to legal questions resemble in some respects our case law in their influence on the growth of
the legal system.
Whether they were interpretations of the words of
the XII Tables, of a statute, an edict, or decisions of
concrete controversies, they naturally went to form a
body of precedent, doctrine and literature to build up
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the law (jura condere), .though at first legislative force
of
was not accorded to them till long after the death
7
their authors by the law of the succeeding period.
Gaius in his Institutes, Book 1. Sect. 7, speaks of Responsa Prudentum as "the answers of jurists or the decisions and opinions of persons authorized to lay down
the law. If they were unanimous their decision has the
force of law, if they disagreed the judge may follow
whichever opinion he chooses, as is ruled by a rescript of
the late Emperor Hadrian." "If the number of jurists
passing upon a given point were equally divided and
Papinian was one of them, the judge was bound to follow the opinion given by the side on which Papinian
was."
Under the Republic the jurists were in the habit of
giving opinions (responsa) both on hypothetical cases
put by their pupils and also when consulted by the litigants, or the judge, in actual litigation, but although the
responsa were sought and forthcoming, they bound nobody, they had as much weight as, and no more than, that
attached to the opinions of an English barrister of today.
If the jurist consulted was of great eminence and skill,
and the facts had been properly stated and grasped by
him, his opinion in all probability represented the legal
position, but only probable, for the judge was absolutely
free to decide in the opposite if he thought right.
The change came with Augustus who instituted a
practice which was continued by later Emperors, under
which certain of the more distinguished were given a
sort of patent, called the jus respondendi, the effect
of which was that if after being consulted, a jurist
invested with this peculiar right gave a written and
sealed opinion, such opinion was to be considered as
having the sanction of the Emperor.
During the time of Gaius, the Responsa Prudentum
were a recognized source of law peculiar to the Ro7Short history of the Roman Law, P. F. Girard p. 546.

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

mans, but it is evident from his account that the functions of these privileged citizens were limited to a
declaration of their opinion of what was law in a given
case, and did not extend to making new rules of law,
which is the proper province of the supreme authority
of the state, but gradually the idea seemed to have been
evolved, probably about the time of Constantine, that
the writings of a few of the greatest jurists had a kind
of special sanctity as "quotable authority" and a difficulty must have presented itself as to what was to be
done, when, as was often the case, they differed. A
partial remedy was found by Constantine who (321
A. D.) abolished the notes of Palus and Ulpianus on
Papinian so as to restore "Papinian" uncorrupted, and
at the same time confirmed the authority of the "Sententiae" of Palus.
The responsa were not of as high authority as the
constitutional leges, but they were law for the case, and
they applied to future cases under the character of principles of equity, and not of precepts of law. In the
ages immediately preceding Jusinian, the civil law
was in a deplorable condition by reason of its magnitude
and disorder and scarcely any genius, says Heineccius,
was bold enough to commit himself to study out such a
labyrinth. When the Emperor Justinian came to the
throne (527 A. D.) Roman law was in almost as chaotic
a state as the law of England is at the present time.
In England, in order to find what legal rules govern a given set of facts it may be necessary to search
the statutes of the realm, one by one, back to feudal
times, and to thread one's way through countless cases
and text books, for text books, though never an actual
source of law, are sometimes the only place where undoubted rules of common law, which have never been
expressed in a judicial decision are to be found.
At
Rome the possible field was even wider.
The Responsa Prudentum resembled English case
law in that all legal language adjusted itself to the as-
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sumption that the text of the old code, e. g., the XII
Table remained unchanged, so there were certain fictions in the Roman laws, as in particular cases the allegation that a party was a Roman citizen could not be denied suggesting the undeniable fictions in the English
law as to common recovery, and, the allegation of the
plaintiff being the King's debtor in cases he brings in
the exchequer. The form of the Responsa Prudentum
differed at different periods of the Roman history.
Whatever was the particular advice given to the client,
the responsum treasured up in the note books of listening students would doubtless contemplate the circumstances as governed by a great legal principle, or included in a sweeping rule. Nothing of this sort has ever
been possible in England or America, and it should be
acknowledged that in the many criticisms passed upon
the English law the way in which it has been enunciated
seems to have been lost sight of. The hesitancy of our
courts in declaring principles may be much more reasonably attributed to the comparative scantiness of -our
precedents, voluminous as they appear to him who is
acquainted with no other system, than to the temper of
the judges.
It is true that in the wealth of legal principle, we
are much poorer than several of the nations of continental Europe, but they, it should be remembered, took
Roman jurisprudence for the foundation of their civil
institutions. They built the debris of the Roman law
into their walls; but in the materials and workmanship
of the residue, there is not much which distinguishes it
favorably from the structure erected by the English
judicature.8
It would be impossible to say how much Roman law
has been absorbed into the English common law.
In
all probability there has been very much more added to
the common law than is generally supposed. There is
sMaine's Ancient Law, p. 38.
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also evidence that certain English judges in rendering
their decisions, and giving their opinions, have copied
largely from the Roman law without giving credit for
the same. There are also innumerable cases, both in
the English and American decisions, where credit has
been given to the Roman law for legal principles which
Doubtless, also, much has
have been taken from it.
Many
been taken from the Roman law inadvertently.
facts would seem to conspire to produce this result. It
is hardly to be supposed that the occupation of Britain
by the Romans for four hundred years would leave no
trace of their laws on the country. The fact, too, that
England is so closely allied in many ways to countries
which have the Roman law for their basis must have
had some influence.
The Canon law is confessedly from the Roman law
and as it was largely the repository from which the rules
of equity were taken, we have in equity, a judicial system
built up almost entirely from the Roman law and apparently that system is destined to fill a much larger
sphere in Anglo-American law than it has heretofore
done. Our Admiralty law has also been largely adopted
from the civil law. Besides, many of the English colonies have inherited the Roman law from their former
occupants, having been governed by different continental
countries of Europe, whose basic law was Roman. Large
areas of the United States were settled by people who
brought with them the principles of the civil law, notably
Louisiana and the vast southwest. Even the east, particularly New York and New England have taken some
beneficial principles from the civil law by the way of Holland. So it seems there are many ways in which the
Roman law has beneficially influenced the common law.
Owing to the diversity of jurisdictions where the common law is administered, we find it much less difficult
to find out what the Roman law was in the time of Justinian than to know what the common law is today in
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certain cases. In the Roman law we find many fine
distinctions drawn which we do not have in Anglo-American law. Following out these distinctions, we see
in most cases they are founded on reason; and therefore
in many points the common law is much more crude than
the older system, which perhaps is not to be wondered
at when we consider that the Romans had many more
centuries in which to perfect their system than we have
had, and furthermore they availed themselves of whatever was good in legal systems that had preceded them,
particularly in what they borrowed from Greece, while
we have in certain cases refused to incorporate from the
Roman law what might have been of great benefit to
our system. We have had, and still have to a certain
extent, an opportunity to profit by the experience of
others and wisdom would direct that we avail ourselves
of the opportunity rather than to act the part of the immature youth who will not listen to the counsel of those
who have travelled the road which he must follow.
As an example of a fixed rule in the Roman law,
we find this as to percolating water in Justijanian's Digest Book 39, Title 3 C. 12. He, who digging in his own
land, draweth away the water of his neighbor, nothing
can be done, for he has no action for his grief and he
ought not to be held guilty in this he did, not with a notion of injuring his neighbor, but of improving his own
land.
Another example is that of the civil law as to
survivorship in case of a common disaster. Take for
instance the laws of California on this subject, adopted
from the civil law, as follows, to wit:
1. If both of those who perish, were under the age
of fifteen years, the older is presumed to have survived.
2. If both are above the age of sixty, the younger
is presumed to have survived.
3. If one be under fifteen and the other above
sixty, the former is presumed to have survived.
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4. If both are over fifteen and under sixty, and
the sex be different, the male is presumed to have survived; if the sex be the same, then the older.
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty and the
other between those ages, the latter is presumed to have
survived.
Presumptions like these are not alien in spirit to
American jurisprudence and yet survivorship laws have
been adopted in only two of the states, to wit: in Louisiana and California. 9
The elaborate ceremony of mancipatio used in the
early days of Rome, wherein a transfer of property was
effected in the presence of six Roman citizens of full
age, one of whom acted as libripens, or balance holder,
and the other five as necessary witnesses, was calculated
to give dignity and publicity to the transaction and to
preserve reliable evidence of the same and was somewhat similar to the English ceremony of livery of seisen.
Here is an interesting English blend of the Roman
laws. Twenty years adverse possession and immemorial
prescription, in the common law, hereditaments are acquired by usage from time immemorial; but according
to Stephen and other authorities enjoyment of real estate for twenty years raises a presumption that it is immemorial. The Roman law requires that the party who
prescribes must begin his occupation in good faith, but
here English law apparently differs from the Roman,
for at common law the possession need not originate
bona fide.1 0 While we have our Equity and Admiralty
law from the civil law, Primeogeniture is modern; there
is not the faintest trace of it among the Romans.:1
In the Roman law the rights and duties of tutors and
curators which correspond to our guardians are regulat9

CaI. Code of Civil Procedure No. 1963, subd. 40.

Stephen's Comm. Bk. II part I Chap. 33.
2OMarkby, Elements of Law See. 582; Williams Inst. of Jus-

tian, p. 100.
"'Dwight's Introduction to Maine's Ancient Laws, p. XLVIII.
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Likewise the rights in
ed by wise and just rules.
property, absolute and usufructuary, and the various
ways by which property may be acquired, enlarged,
transferred and lost and the various incidents and accommodations which justly belong to property are very
admirably and clearly discussed and set forth in the Roman law, and very refined and equitable distinctions are
pointed out and vindicated. Trusts are established and
enunciated through all their many modifications and
complicated details, in the most equitable and rational
manner. Also the many rights and duties which flow
from personal contracts of all kinds, whether expressed
or implied and according to the infinite variety and
shapes which they assume in the business and commerce
of the world, are defined and illustrated. with a clearness and brevity unequalled.
Not only in these respects, but also in many others the Roman law exhibits proof of a very high civilization and refinement, and
those who study it closely cannot avoid the conviction
that it was the fruitful source of those extensive views
and grand principles which were applied to enrich the
jurisprudence of modern times. The grand total of the
Roman law will evoke neverfailing praise and curiosity
and will receive the homage of the learned, as a grand
monument of wisdom. It fills so large a place in the
sphere of human reason; it affects so many interests of
mankind in their social and civilized relations, it embraces so much of study, meditation, experience and
work, it conducts us such distance inta antiquity and it
has existed so long against the waves and storms of
time that it is impossible while contemplating the system not to be struck with veneration for it.12
The common law of England is not to be taken in
all respects as that of America. Our ancestors brought
with them its general principles and claimed it as their
2Kent's Commentaries, p. 548.
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birthright but they brought with them and adopted only
that portion which was applicable to their situation. 13
In many cases wherein the common law was inadequate, the American states have adopted rules and principles from the Roman law. Witness the adoption laws
transplanted into the legal systems of each one of the
states of the union. The civil law system of reckoning
degrees of relationship, which is much more simple and
scientific than the other systems, has been adopted in
The
many states in place of the common law plan.
laws of descentt and distribution as set out in Novel 118
of the Constitution of Justinian, being the most equitable mode of distributing property of an intestate, have
been adopted in part or in toto by many of the American
states. While these are examples of statutes of the
Romans which have endured to the present time, we
find that the canons of descent as given by Blackstone,
have been discarded and the more humane laws of the
Romans adopted in their place.
The responses of the early Roman jurists were not
They
published in the modern sense by their authors.
were written down and edited by their pupils and were
therefore in all probability not arranged according to
any scheme or classification The rule of stare decisis
as used and adopted in the common law is responsible
for our court made law, wherein if a wrong principle
is once adopted into the law it is apt to be continued and
copied into other cases and sometimes into other jurisdictions and is a.detriment to the sysem in this respect;
and so a rule founded on a bad principle is given the dignity of law. This confuses the functions of the judiciary department with those of the legislative which is contrary to the American idea of government.
The courts of civil law countries not being bound
by previous decisions are not subject to this danger. A
possible reason why the doctrine of stare decisis was not
13Van Ness vs. Pacard, 2 Peters 137.
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adopted in the early days of Rome may have been that
the Responsa Prudentum was not rendered by the bench
but by the bar. The decisions of a Roman tribunal
though exclusive in the particular case had no ulterior
authority except such as was given by the professional
repute of the magistrate who happened to be in office
for the time being. Properly speaking there was no
institution at Rome during the republic, analogous to the
English bench. There were indeed magistrates, invested with important judicial functions in their especial
department, but the term of office of the magistrate
was only for a year, so that they are much less aptly compared to a judiciary than to a cycle of offices briskly
circulating among the leading members of the bar.
Doubtless there might be very much said on the origin of a condition of things which looked to us like a
startling anomoly, but which was in fact much more
congenial than our own system to the spirit of ancient
societies, tending as they always did, to split into distinct orders which, however, exclusive themselves, tolerated no professional hierarchy above them. 4
In our own time and country, we find in our legal
system things which remind us of the Responsa Prudenturn. Take for example that most excellent provision
in the constitutions of Massachusetts and Maine, which
empowers the legislature to refer a measure pending in
that body to he Supreme court for its opinion as to
whether if such measure were enacted into law, it would
This provision has frequently prebe constitutional.
vented the enactment of unconstitutional laws and pointed the way to the enactment of constitutional ones, thus
avoiding a vast amount of trouble and litigation. Another
instance of a fundamental principle taken from the Roman law is to be found in the very first part of the
Declaration of Independence wherein it is declared that
14Maine's Ancient Law, p. 34.
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"all men are created equal," a statement taken from
Book 50 T., 17 C. 32 of Justinian's Digest, "omnes homines natura aequales sunt,"' 15 and which we have made
the corner stone of our republic.
The history of the development of our law as to
mortgages, especially with regard to the rules of equity
as applied to those instruments, is quite similar to the
of the
same law
history of the development
among the Romans and the results arrived at in the
two systems are practically the same. Are there not
other branches of our law yet in a crude state which in
their development will follow the Roman? The two systems have both worked for the same results, to wit: the
That
adoption of the best rule to secure good results.
is
and
profitable
proper
how
eminently
the
case,
being
a thorough acquaintance with the principles embodied in
the Roman law.
In connection with the subject of conveyancing one
is also reminded that our new plan for the registration
of land titles as carried out in the Torrens system of confirming real estate titles is in a slight degree at least
suggested by the Responsa Prudentum. That is to say
the fact as to whether a person has a good title to land
is pre-judged to the extent that he is immune to the results of future suits concerning his title to that land;
similarly to the pre-judgments of the jurisconsulti in
giving their Responsa Prudentum. We are also similarly
reminded of Roman methods by our various actions
to quiet title and somewhat so by proceedings in the
courts having probate jurisdiction wherein a form for
the petition is furnished you by the court.
In order to avail ourselves of that which is good in
the Roman law, it is as necessary to know what not to
take as it is to know what to take from it. -If Blackstone had been more familiar with the principles and
workings of the patria potestas he would never have

-

15

See writings of Ulpian; also Maine's Ancient Law, p. p. 89,
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made the mistake he did in trying to explain the reasons
why half bloods should not be permitted to inherit with
the whole bloods, a principle which need not have been
absorbed into our law for the reason that certain conditions which prevailed among the Romans did not exist
in England, and the rule could not be applied, and was
not applied as it formerly had been in Rome, for there
the agnostic half bloods never were excluded but only
the uterine ones. So now we find that this law which
at the time of its adoption from the Roman law was
only partially understood is being discarded in many
jurisdictions. Nevertheless there is much in the Roman
law which suits modern conditions for it existed so long
that it became a great storehouse of legal principles, for
"that which is just and true" lives forever. The Roman
legal system has the longest known history of any judiAll the changes that it underwent have
cial system.
From its commencement
been fairly well ascertained.
to its close, it was continually being modified for the better, or for what the authors of those modifications conceived to be for the better, and the course of improvement was continued through periods at which all the
rest of human thought and action materially slackened.
its pace and repeatedly threatened to settle down into
stagnation.18

Lex Regia
It has been said that it was an indelible and foul
blot on the civil law as digested under Justinian that it
expressly avowed and inculcated the doctrine of the absolute power of the Emperor, and that all the right and
power of the Roman people was transferred to him.
This had not till then been the language of the Roman
law and Gravina with much indignation charges the
introduction of the lex regis to the fraud and servility of
Tribonian. Be that as it may be the slaim of depotism
1

Maine's Ancient Law, p. 23.
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became afterwards a constitutional principle of imperial legislation.'7 But this law in no way affected the
private law unless in fact it may have had a tendency
to improve it, for where there was so much power and
responsibility there would naturally be a desire to retain
it by enacting laws which would be acceptable to the
people, indeed this course would be almost a necessity
with an inteligent constituency. In any event the lex
regia came so late and the private law of the system had
been so fully developed that it was not likely to be
marred even by an imperial decree.
On the other hand the English law started out
with the idea of centraliation in that it was built upon
the feudal system, and the Roman and American doctrine that all men are created equal was never enforced
or attempted to be enforced in England. In fact the
English doctrine is that all men are not created equal.
The principles inherited from the feudal system have
never met the requirements of our free American institutions and we have in the well developed civil law
something that is more fitted to our needs.
There are still doubtless many matters that might
arise where we would have no law to fit the case and
wherein the civil law might be used to advantage by
being incorporated into our law, as for instance, in the
case of the law of survivorship in a common disaster,
and also in the case of the murder of an ancestor, in
which case many of our states have no express law
while the civil law has made provision for such cases, as
it had minute and salutary laws concerning such matters
even going so far as to provide expressly that if the
beneficiary attempts the life of the testator, he cannot
take under the testament. Some courts have followed
the civil law in certain cases where the common law
gave no direction. In the case of Acton vs. Blundell,
17Digest 1-4-1 Codex 1-14-12.

Inst. 1-2-6.
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reported in 12 M. & W., the court said: "The Roman
law forms no rule binding in itself upon the subject of
this realm; but in deciding a case upon principle, where
no direct authority can be cited from our books, it affords no small evidence of the soundness of the conclusion at which we have arrived, if it prove to be supported
by that law, the fruit of the research of the most learnied
men, the collective wisdom of ages, and the groundwork
of the municipal law of most of the countries of Europe."
Again in admiralty cases where the defendant has
a claim against the plaintiff, which he desires to plead
and have allowed, resort is had to the Institutes of Justinian. 9 Likewise as to the natural increase from property subject to a chattel mortgage, the common law
courts have unquestionably adopted the rule of the civil
law on the subject.
The lawyers and people of England have always
shown a jealousy, both of the principles and practice of
the civil law. But by degrees in cases where the civil
law is clearly right, jealousy gives way to good sense and
justice.20 Our probate and testamentary laws are confessedly no part of the common law, which did not admit of devises, and the civil law is the repository of the
principles by which international intercourse is regulatLikewise it originated the law mercantile and
ed.
maritime and it is copious on the subjects of contracts,
covenants and other obligations which are topics of frequent discussion in the commercial world.21
In questions of rational law, no cause can be assigned why we should not shorten our own labor, by resorting occasionally to the wisdom of ancient jurists,
many of whom were the most ingenious and sagacious
of men. What is good sense in one age, must be good
'9Institutes 4-6-30 and 39. The C. B. Sanford 22 Fed. 863.
2lNorth American Review, Oct. 1820.

2Tilghman C. J. 3 Binney 507.
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sense, all circumstances remaining the same in another; and pure unsophisticated reason is the same in
Italy and in England in the minds of Papinian and of
22
Blackstone.
The Corpus Juris Civilis bears marks unquestionably of great precipitation; but with all its imperfections, it is a most valuable mine of judicial knowledge.
It gives law at this day to the greater part of the world
and though few English lawyers dare make such an ackowledgment, it is the true source of nearly all our English laws that are not of feudal origin. 23 In comparing
the two legal systems, the comments of the writers in
one or the other system are certainly competent and
2
relevant. 4

Admiralty
The general rules of practice in Admiralty come to
us directly from the Roman law. The form of the libel
and answer, the securities, or stipulation taken to enforce the jurisdiction of the court, the interrogatories
put to the parties, in the progress of the trial, after the
pleadings are completed, the method of proceeding by
default and successive decrees, are all derived directly
from the practice of the Roman forum, or from that practice as it is modified by the usages of civil law courts
in modern times. 25 The affidavit required of the libelant to the debt or claim on which the action is brought
corresponds to the oath of calumny required of the actor
by the Roman law: Quod non calumniandi animo litem
26
se novisse, sed existimando bonam causam habere. Our
practice in Admiralty following the Roman law, requires the defendant to verify his answer by his oath.27
22VIJones on Bailments p. 604.
23
LIfe
4

of Sir Wm. Jones by Lord Teignmouth p. 308 4th ed.
2 Gayle vs. Cunningham, 1 Harper (S. C. Esq.) p. 110.
254 Blackstone's Comm. p. 446, Brown's Civil and Admiralty

Law 26Vol. II p. 348.
Inst. 4-16-1 Codex 2-59-2.
7Clavik's Praxis I p. 24.
Gammell vs. Skinner 2 Gall. 45.
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Vexatious Suits
In all countries, and under all systems of jurisprudence, it was found necessary to establish some check
to causeless and vexatious litigation.
In the jurisprudence of the common law the principal check is the liability to costs. But in the jurisprudence of ancient
Rome, it appears that a party was not liable for costs
of the adverse party, merely because judgment was rendered against him. He was liable only when he instituted an action without probable cause; that is, when
the suit was vexatious, or, in the language of the Roman
law, calumnious; and the costs were not given against
him as a part of the judgment, but could be recovered
only by a new action called an action of calumny, corresponding to an action for malicious suits at common
law. By this action the party could recover ordinarily
a tenth, but in some cases a fifth and even a fourth, of
the sum in controversy in the former action. This was
given as an indemnity for his expenses, in being oblig28
ed to defend himself against a vexatious suit.
In the time of Justinian, and perhaps at an earlier
period, the action of calumny had fallen into disuse, and
he as a substitute required the oath of calumny. The
oath required was in substance an affidavit on the part
of the actor, that the debt or cause of action, on which
the suit was brought, was in his opinion, well founded,
and on the part of the defendant, that the defense was
made in good faith and in the belief that it was a good
29
defense.
Another part of the Roman jurisprudence from
which our admiralty practice has been in part derived,
is the interrogatory actions of the Roman law. These
were derived from the edicts of the Praetor and constituted a part of that large portion of the law of Rome
28
Gaii
9

Comm. Lib. 4, sec. 176-8, Justinian's.Inst. 4-16-1.
2 Codex 2-59-2. Inst. 4-16-1.
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called Jus Praetoriumor Jus Honorarium. They were
resorted to in all cases where the actor required a discovery: ubicumque judicem aequitas moverit, aeque
opotere fieri interrogationem,dubium non est.

Custom
Both the English case law and the Responsa Prudentum are intended to be exponents of custom. The
common law grew out of the general customs of the
country, and consists of definitions of those customs and
of those ancillary principles that naturally accompany
them, or are deduced from them. The common law of
one country or century is not necessarily the common
law of another, because customs change. This is the
sort of law that is and must be recognized as valid in
all countries and it is created by the people themselves
and not by any legislative act.3 1 Its precepts abound
in the Roman law, and their authority is thus defined:
Diutura consuetudo pro jure et lege observari solet, non
minus quam ea jura quae scripta sunt? Et non solum
suffragio legislatoris,sed etiam tacito consenses omnium
per desuetudinem abrogentur.32 Coke and Bracton expressed very similar principles.3 3
Common law, then, is founded on popular custom,
and when the judges declare it, they merely discover
and declare what they find existing in the life of the
people as the rule of their relations; and it is thus that
general customs have always found their way, as law,
If the custom passes
into our treaties and reports
away, the laws that grow out of it go with it, on the
principle, cessante ratione, cessat lex.
3-10-2.
3oCodex
3

Inst. 4-6-33.

"Effmnger vs. Lewis, 32 Penn. St. 367.

32

C. C. 32-33-35.
Inst. 97b, l10b, 113a, Bracton 1-3-2 and 1-5-5.
iEfmnger vs. Lewis, 32 Penn. St. 367.
Digest 1-3,
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Tendencies in Modern Law
In comparing the characteristics of the two systems
we find that from the time of the old Roman law to the
present there has been a gradual dissolution of family
dependency and the growth of individual obligation has
taken its place. The tie between man and man which
replaces those rights and duties which have their origin
in the family is contract. It was the tendency of former law to fix the condition or "status" of persons by positive rules; in modern times, the condition of persons is
commonly the immediate or remote result of agreement.
The movement has been from status to contract, from
fixed position to voluntary choice. 35 Thus the modern
tendences in our laws are to develop and increase individual rights, and, other things being equal, the country wherein its citizens have the most rights, consistent with like rights in others, is the most progressive
and prosperous and the most desirable in which to live.
Whereas many people were slaves under the Roman law and more recently by our own law and such
people had no rights, or next to none, now every human
being under the American law has what is intended
(theoretically at least) to be equal rights. In Rome
the patre filleas practically owned his children till the
time of his death. In English speaking countries children are emancipated as soon as they are full grown
and the control of the parent over them is not primarily for his benefit but for that of the children during
the tender years of development. In the Roman law
the wife was in the power of her husband, practically
under his absolute control. In the Anglo-American law
of today her individuality is not lost. In early Roman
law the plebians had few individual rights and by the
early English law the common people had but slightly
more than such people had in ancient Rome, while in
35Dwight Introduction to Maine's Ancient Law, pp. 32, 40.
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America today the people are theoretically equal and
the working out of that theory is each year increasing
the rights of the individual, at least the rights of those
who before did not enjoy all the rights which it was
feasible and safe for them to enjoy. The development
of both systems increased individual rights, that is, in
both systems the importance of the individual was increased.
By the Roman law a person did not become sui
juris till he was twenty-five years of age and not fully
then in the sense in which he does now at twenty-one by
our law. The ultimate finite existence is that of the individual and all true philosophy recognizes that society
exists for the individual, and not the individual for so36
ciety.

Extent of the Two Systems
The civil law is a world system of law. It was
such up to the fall of Constantinople, on May 29, 1453,
and in a certain sense has been full as much, or much
so, since that date inasmuch as it is the basic law for a
large part of Europe much of Africa, a considerable
part of Asia and North America, and the whole of South
America. The common law next to the civil, comes
the nearest to being a world system, although a considerable part of the Anglo-American law comes, from
the Roman. Thus we see the truth and force of the
words of D'Aguesseau that, "the grand destinies of
Rome are not yet accomplished; she reigns throughout
the world by her reason after having ceased to reign
by her authority."

Women Under the Two Systems
The position of woman in the ancient law is explained by the patria potestas. The agnate bond in her
36

GHistory of the Development of Law, Morris, p. 12.
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case was not released by the death of her parent. She
could never become the head of a family, as her brother
. might. When her father died she came under perpetual guardianship of her nearest male relative. This
rule of ancient law however disappeared from the matured jurisprudence of the Roman Empire.
At this
point we observe a remarkable contrast between ancient
and modern law. Under the early system woman was
subordinate to her relatives; under the modern, to her
husband. Under the early Roman law, marriage could
be contracted in any one of three forms, one of which
was religious and the other two civil. In view of the
law, the wife became the husband's daughter and he
exercised over her the patri potestas. He could appoint a guardian over her whose authority continued
after his death.
In the later Roman law a form of marriage was
recognized which left the wife theoretically under the
care of guardians whom her parents had appointed, but
practically when that guardianship became obsolete under no control whatever. In modern law, there is a
two-fold element. The later Roman jurisprudence has
been adopted so far as to emancipate married women
from the control of their male relatives, while married
women, though the influence of religious sentiment and
early notions prevalent among the dominant races from
which modern nations have sprung, are governed by
rules of an imperfect civilization. These systems of
law are the most severe upon married women; they borrow their rules from the- Canon law.
As to the married woman under the common law,
her real estate practically belonged to her husband during their joint lives as he had the use of it for that period, and should there be a child born to them during the
coverture he had such use till the time of his death. He
was entitled to the benefit of her leases for his life time
and if he choose to dispose of them, her future right
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to them was extinguished. If he outlived her they belonged to him absolutely. Her choses in action belonged to him if he chose to reduce them to his possession
and her tangible personal property became his at the
moment of marriage. The legal personality of the wife
was merged in that of her husband and she had no power
to make a contract. Her earnings belonged to him and
he could collect them in an action at law. The wife
could not convey her land except by the fictitious judicial proceedings of fine and recovery. The Statute of
Wills gave her no power to make a will and she could
not make a testament of her personal property except by
37
permission of her husband.

Lawyers and Jurisconsuiti
The comparison between English case law and the
Responsa Prudentum suggests a statement by Howe in
his studies of the civil law wherein he says: "It will not
be asked of the lawyer how many verdicts did he gain
by appeal to the meaner passions of a jury; nor how
many times did he successfully wrench and twist the
rules of law in such a way as suited his client's case;
but what was his influence in developing in fair and
fruitful form the jurisprudence of his country; what
old abuse did he destroy? What new and needed reform
did he construct? Did he, like Tribonian, convert the
laws of an Empire, which had been a wilderness, into
a garden; did he, like Domat, trace the civil law in its
natural order as it flowed from these two great commands of love to God and love to man; did he like Hardwick, become the father of equity; did he, like Stowell,
well nigh create for modern commercial nations the
rules of beligerent rights; did he, like John Marshall,
expound the constitution of a great and new country;
did he put the result of his experience in a good book
a7Maine's Ancient Law, pp. 36, 37 and 38.
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for the benefit of his successors in the profession? If
any of these questions, or questions of a like nature can
be answered in favor of the lawyer, fame and honest
fame shall be decreed him.38

Growth of the Civil Law in the United States
The common law and the civil law have not maintained their respective positions in the United States.
The situation is that of transition from the common law
to the civil law. It is natural that the same should have
been gradual and almost imperceptible, instead of being
brought about at once; and the change has been surely
and unerringly going on ever since the establishment of
our colonies, but of course more thor6ughly since the
establishment of American independence.
Ever since
the Fourth of July, 1776, the law-making power has
been continually at work to eliminate the feudal law and
to substitute for it the principles of the civil law. One
of the very first acts of each and all of the states was
to repudiate the laws of inheritance as laid down in the
English law, with all their feudal incidents, and to enact
laws of inheritance in substantial accord with those of
the civil law; the state of New York even going so far
as to declare that the tenure of land should be allodial,
as in the Roman law, and not feudal as by the common
law, although this had practically been previously established by the adoption of the Roman law of inheritance.
The work of substitution and elimination has gone
on gradually but surely. Almost every salient feature
of the common law of England has been banished from
our social system and from our jurisprudence. We have
abolished the invidious distinctions between males and
femlaes in the inheritance laws; we are also rapidly
abolishing them in our political laws and we have discarded as far as possible all the intricate incidents of
feudal tenure-their name is legion and they cannot
38 Howe's Studies in the Civil Law p. 370.
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all be reached at once and possibly some of them are,
innocuous.39
The Romans certainly had a genius for discovering
the true principles of law. No race before or since their
time have contributed so much to the world's stock of
enduring law as the Romans. No nation of Christendom would today occupy anywhere near as advanced
a position as it now does, had it not been for the influence of the Roman law or its judicial system. Her jurists delighted in discovering rules of law which would
advance the cause of justice and equity, and what greater satisfaction can one have than the contemplation of
the fact that he has contributed to the world's permahent
store of rules calculated to enhance the comfort and convenience of the human race for all time.
For once a
good law becomes fully established its existence will
probably be known through all the ages.
We may not be able to say that in all cases the Roman system, which had as one of its features the Responsa Prudentum, is better than the English case system.
The Responsa Prudentum had the advantage that it
was delivered at, or before the time of the trial and
not as in the court opinions, in some instances weeks,
or even months, after the hearing, when other matters
had pressed themselves upon the attention of the court.
Moreover the jurisconsulti were not trammeled by the requirements of the doctrine of stare decisis in rendering
their opinions as are the Anglo-American courts.
It is almost pitiable to note the dilemma in which
our courts sometimes find themselves when they are
forced to acknowledge that the law as it exists, does
not meet the ends of justice, but having been previously
decided in a particular way they do not feel at liberty to
adopt the better rule.
The jurisconsulti do not correspond exactly to our
89
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judges nor yet precisely to our lawyers. Probably the
functions of our lawyers are more nearly like those of
the jurisconsulti than are the duties of our judges. Can
we adopt the Responsa Prudentum into our system of
law? Probably not in the form it existed in the Roman
law. We have noted certain methods in the AngloAmerican law that are in a slight degree similar to the
Responsa Prudentum, at least, one reminds us of the
other and we find these methods in the most useful and
progressive parts of our law. We refer to the recently
adopted process of confirming land titles, the equitable
procedure of banishing a cloud on a title to real estate,
our probate practice and other similar matters. Are
there not other ways in which we may advantageously
employ the methods of the Roman jurisconsulti?
May not our judges on being retired on account of
length of services be employed, at least a part of their
time, in a manner similar to the way in which the jurisconsulti rendered service? Of course it would not be
possible for retired judges to give opinions in individual
cases but in nearly every state there are institutions
for the training and education of persons who. aim to
become lawyers. Would it be unreasonable, or impracticable to require our judges who are retired on pay to
give one or two, or more courses of instruction in the
State law schools each year?
The valuable work of
Chancellor Kent as a law instructor and in writing his
commentaries after his retirement from the bench suggests the feasibility of such a plan. This might tend
to the production of better equipped and more useful
lawyers and thus to the diminution of litigation, which
for many reasons is an object desirable of being attained. If we had better lawyers, then in time better judges
and in the end better case law.
It may not be practicable that our people should
have the advantage of the best attainable legal advise
free of charge, but that is what the people of Rome had
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in the early days of the Responsa Prudentum. Every
man is bound to know the law, and yet at the present
time it is in many cases very expensive knowledge for
the layman to acquire when he is in need of it for a particular case; more than that a legal opinion that is
bought and paid for is not apt to be an unbiased opinion.
If there were some way whereby our citizens could secure reliable, unprejudiced and unbiased legal opinions
from able counsellors without an extra charge in each
particular case, that would seem to be desirable and we
should be just in the position Roman citizens were in
the early days of the Responsa Prudentum.o
ROBT. WORTH LYMAN.
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MOOT COURT
ARRISON v. BRITAIN
Real Estate--Lateral SupportRights of Adjoining OwnersWhen Negligence Must Be Proved-Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining tracts of land. On
Arrison's land was a dwelling house, 20 feet from the division line.
Britain was extracting coal from his land, a result of which was
a sliding over of a portion of Arrison's land, a cracking of it
and an injury to the house. He sues for damages but gives no
evidence of negligence in Britain. He claims for injury to the
house, and also for injury to his land.
Cohen, for plaintiff.
Farrell, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
CHYLAK, J. Two questions for consideration present themselves to this court. I. Whether the defendant in operating his own
mine is liable to an adjoining surface owner for injuries resulting
from his excavations. 2. Whether the defendant under the same
circumstances, is liable to the adjoining owner for injuries to
buildings located on the land which has subsided vithout proof of
any negligence on part of the person making excavations.
Under the C. L. rule, the owner
Taking the first question.
of minerals is bound to so conduct his operations in the removal
of them as not to disturb the adjacent surface and do injury to
the owner hereof. This is the settled law in England, followed in
this country and well settled in the law of Penna. In McGettigan
v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155, and Matulop v. Coal & Iron Co., 201 Pa.
70, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to the natural lateral
support of her land or ground, and if the same were withdrawn
by her neighbor in mining operations on its own land, for an injury to her lots resulting from withdrawal of such support or
from excavations, compensations must be made. The right to
such lateral support is an absolute one and the adjoining owner
who withdraws it or excavates, whether negligent or not, is liable
In the first case
for injuries resulting to his neighbors land.
cited, Justice Green citing, Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 and
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McGuire v. Grant, 1 N. J., 356, with approval says: "But in the
case of land, which is fixed in its place, each owner has the absolute right to have his land remain in its natural condition unnecessary consequence from this principle that for any injury to
his soil resulting from removal of natural support to which it is
entitled, the owner has a legal remedy in an action at law against
the party by whom the work was done. This does not depend on
negligence, but upon violation of a right of property which has
been invaded. This unqualified rule is limited to injuries caused
to land itself and does not afford relief for damages by the same
means to artificial structures or buildings. For an injury to
buildings, which is unavoidable, incident to the depresson or
affected by any act of his neighbor, and if the neighbor digs upon
or improves his land so as to injure this right, an action may
be maintained against him for damages without proof of any
negligence." There is no doubt whatever as to the soundness of
this view and further discussion of the first 4uestion is unnecessary, and therefore must be answered in the affirmative.
Now we proceed to the second question. This question can
be answered by referring to cases cited above. It has been held
that the lateral support of land to which the owner thereof has an
absolute right and for the deprivation of which by his neighbor
he can maintain an action without proof of negligence, extends
only to the land itself in its natural condition and does not include support for protection of buildings upon it. This is well
settled in England and also with us. Since this absolute right is
limited to the land itself in its natural condition, there can be no
recovery for injuries to buildings, or improvements resulting
from withdrawal of such support in the absence of proof of negliThis is
gence or carelessness in excavating adjoining land.
equally well settled and the rule is no where more distinctly announced than in Doley v. Wyeth, 2 Mass. 131, where the court
after referring to absolute rights of an adjoining owner of land
to lateral support for it in its natural condition said: "It is a
slide of the soil, on which they stand, caused by the excavation of
a pit on adjoining land, an action can only be maintained when
a want of due care or skill or positive negligence has contributed
to produce it." In Alexander v. Colon, 72 Superior 1, the court
Negligence or want
expressly ruled upon this point as follows:
of due care in excavating or mining adjoining lands for which
there is liability for injury to a neighbor's building means positive
negligence or manifest want of due care in the mining operations,
so far as they affect adjoining properties. In the absence of
any evidence of such negligence there can be no recovery. Hence
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the second question presented must be answered in the negative.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The carefully written opinion of the trial court makes extended discussion by us of the questions involved, superfluous.
For disturbance of plaintiff's land, as distinguished from the
building, by defendant's excavations, the latter is liable, whether
they were made with care or not. 12 Forum (Dickinson Law Review) p. 101. The case recognizing this principle is Alexander v.
Conlon, 72 Superior 1.
It is equally well settled that there is no liability for injury
to a house, fence, a chicken house, a building, a wall. unless there
has been negligence. 12 Forum, p. 102.
No evidence of the negligence of the defendant was given.
Negligence is not presumed. It must be proved. We must assume that whatever would have been reasonably expected of the
defendant, to avert a possible injury to the house, he did.
The trial court has allowed a recovery of damages for the
caving in of plaintiff's land, but has denied damages for the injury to the house. The judgment therefore must be affirmed.

CLARK v. COMSTOCK
Party Wall Legislation-Constitutionality-Act of June 7, 1895,
P. L. 135.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In a city in which there is the usual party wall legislation,
Clark and Comstock owned adjacent lots. On Clark's lot was a
house, the outer surface of whose wall was exactly coincident with
the division line. The house is three stories in height. Comstock's
house was vacant. In 1918 he decided to erect a seven story
building and to avail himself of the right to make a party wall.
This would entail the necessity of taking down the wall of Clark's
house. Comstock asked the building inspector to authorize the act.
He did so and the taking down of the wall was about to begin
when Clark applied for an injunction denying the legal right to
take down the wall.
Bashore for Plaintiff.
Unger for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
SHARMAN, J. In a city of the first class, authority to erect
a party wall is. given by the Act of Feb. 24, 1721; in the cities of
the second class by the Acts of June 7, 1895, and May 5, 1899.
Since this was a city "in which there is the usual party wall legislation" it is of no consequence under which of the above acts Coinstock claimed his rights, so far as the decision of this case is concerned. The municipal inspector duly authorized the removal of
the plaintiff's wall and his decision in each particular case in final.
Evans & Watson, v. Jayne, 23 Pa. 34; Childs v. Napheys, 112 Pa.
504; Godshall v. Miriam, 1 Binney 352.
In the case at bar, we can assume, the contrary not appearing,
that the proceedings were in accord with the provisions of one of
the acts of assembly. The plaintiff neither alleged nor endeavored
to prove the defendant had not strictly complied with the law; but
claimed to restrain the defendant upon the theory that the legislation authorizing the proceedings is unconstitutional.
The efficacy of these contentions can best be waived by quoting
part of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion delivered in 1907 in the case
of Heron v. Houston, 217 Pa. 1. "It is too late at this day to question abstractly the right of the legislature to confer upon municipalities the power of regulating party walls. Never since we have
been a state have we been without legislation of this kind; and
every enactment on the subject has contained the fundamental feature here challenged--constitutional warrant for the appropriation,
under municipal regulation, by one of two adjoining lot owners of a
certain portion of the others land, for the construction of a party
wall for their common enjoyment and use. This legislation has not
only been acquiesced in and acted upon until it has become a
settled rule of property, which it would be most dangerous to public
interest to disturb, but its constitutionality has been recognized by
judicial authority in unmistakable terms. * * * The principle
upon which these enactments rest is the general police power of the
state. While it must be admitted that they are toa certain extent
an interference with that exclusive enjoyment ordinarily incident
to ownership of land, and are therefore to be strictly construed;
Hoffstat v. Voight, 146 Pa. 632; yet our adjudications under them
are but so many repeated recognitions of their correspondence with
constitutional limitations."
The fact that the outer surface of Clark's house was exactly coincident with the division line will in no way militate against Coinstock's right to tear it down for as was brought out in the appeal
of the Western National bank, 102 Pa. 171, "this right cannot be
taken away from him by the adjoining owner building exclusively
upon his own land, either to the line or a short distance therefrom."
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An apt conclusion to such a state of facts is drawn by Mr. Justice
Stewart in 217 Pa. 1, supra, in these words: "The fact that the
erection of the party wall here complained of will involve the appropriation and possible removal of appellant's (plaintiff's) eastern
wall, built wholly within his own line, and so contract the dimensions of his present hall or entry to his building, only furnishes
another illustration of how general laws in their application may in
individual cases result in apparent severity and injustice. Such
apparent inequality necessarily results; but all are alike exposed
to the chance, and the risk is part of the price which each pays for
equal participation in all that is provided for the general safety and
the common good."
No better exposition of the law at present in regard to party
walls can be found than in the able and exhaustive opinion of Mr.
Justice Moschzisker, delivered Jan. 7, 1919, in Jackmon v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, in which the constitutionality of such legislation is upheld.
By section 9 of the act of June 7, 1895, P. L. 135, the court of
common pleas is empowered to enjoin a subsequent builder from
cutting into or using a wall, a's in this case, until the cost of the
same, i. e., the original wall, is paid. It does not appear from the
facts that the plaintiff died not receive compensation in compliance
with this section of the act.
We fail to see that the plaintiff has made out a case and the
bill is therefore DISMISSED.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The constitutionality of party wall legislation has been too
often recognized in this state, to make discussion of it advisable.
Each of two owners of contiguous lots in a city or borough,
has the right, when he builds on his lot, to project the wall next to
his neighbor, across the mathematical boundary, and plant onehalf of its thickness on his neighbor's land. Of this right he cannot be deprived by the fact that his neighbor has already built a
wall up to the division line. "When either lot holder," says Moschzisker, J., "builds on his own property up to the division line he
doets so with the knowledge that, in case of the erection of a party
wall, that part of his building which encroaches upon the portion
of the land subject to the easement will have to come down, if not
suitable for incorporation into the new wall." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 171.
Clark's house was of three stories, and stood wholly on his lot.
That the wall toward Comstock's lot was strong enough to sustain
the weight of four additional stories is quite unlikely. The build-
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ing inspector was satisfied that the demolition of the wall was unavoidable. We see no reason for the court's interfering with the
process.
The conclusion reached by the lucid opinion of the learned
court below must be accepted, and the appeal from the decree refusing the injunction, must be DISMISSED.

BOOK REVIEW
Federal Criminal Law and Procedure by Elijah N. Zoline, of
the New York Bar, with an introduction by Hon. Henry Wade
Rogers, Judge of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Publishers, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1921.
This important work is in three volumes. The first, contains
Judge Rodgers' Introduction, the Table of Cases, and 45 chapters
on various procedural topics. A few of their titles are: Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts; Due Process of Law, Arrest without
Warrant; Venue Right to Counsel, Confrontative of Witnesses;
Self-incrimination, Indictments, Ex post facto laws, Limitations,
Former Jeopardy, Pardon, Jury Trial, etc. Chapter 33, contains a
valuable and interesting treatise on the subject of Evidence. The
first volume concludes with a discussion of international extradition, and inter-state rendition.
The second volume containing 730 pages, deals with the various crimes that have been defined by federal legislation. It would
serve no useful purpose to enumerate them.
The third volume, of 783 pages, contains a collection of
Forms. Crimes are divided into 17 groups, and illustrative forms
pertaining to each, are presented.
These three volumes may be cordially recommended to the
attention of students and practitioners in the Federal Courts.
The style is simple, clear, and terse. The pertinent statutes and
decisions may be quickly found. Familiarity with the constitutional principles underlying the criminal law, is everywhere manifest. The books are well printed, and are as attractive in appearance, as their contents are interesting and important.

